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The three papers in this dissertation all deal with new challenges for energy policy.  
The first paper deals with mitigation of market power in deregulated wholesale 
electricity markets, while the second and third papers deal with reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
The first paper experimentally tests a novel mechanism used to suppress the exercise 
of market power in New York City and neighboring West Chester.  We find that this 
mechanism can reduce market prices.  However, if generation owners have enough 
market power even during periods without transmission-system congestion, as may be 
true in some parts of the world, the owners are able to gradually raise the market price 
well above short-run marginal cost in spite of the mechanism.  If they are not able to 
do this, the mechanism keeps the market price of electricity too low during times of 
high demand to induce adequate investment in generation and energy conservation. 
 
The second paper simulates the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, which will 
impose a cap-and-trade program on the carbon dioxide emissions of the electric power 
sector in ten northeastern US states.  Constraints in the power transmission system, an 
alternating-current system, affect the cost of the policy and the emission increases it 
will induce in neighboring states and provinces.  To our knowledge, this is the first 
study that uses an alternating-current model to predict the effects of an environmental 
 policy.  We find that there are important differences between our simulation’s 
predictions and those of a direct-current approximation. 
 
The third paper examines the possibility of time inconsistency in public decision-
making.  In time inconsistency, an individual’s preferences over a set of outcomes 
change as a function of only his reference point in time relative to the outcomes.  We 
show that time inconsistency in group decisions can lead to welfare losses.  Through a 
simple experiment and historical examples, we produce evidence that time 
inconsistency may exist in public decision-making, particularly when males are 
involved.  We also discuss implications for public policy and means of reducing time 
inconsistency. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The three papers in this dissertation all deal with new challenges for energy 
policy.  Two of the most important new realities of energy are wholesale electric 
industry deregulation and pressure to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  The first 
paper deals with electric deregulation, while the second and third papers deal with 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. 
Though the deregulation of wholesale electricity prices was intended largely to 
reduce electricity prices, it creates the possibility that power plant owners may raise 
prices by exercising market power.  One of the main proposed responses is “automatic 
mitigation procedures” that reduce the offer prices of generation owners if those prices 
violate both a “conduct screen” and an “impact screen.”  So far, in the United States, 
automatic mitigation procedures have been adopted only in the part of New York State 
that includes New York City and neighboring West Chester.  In chapter 1 of this 
dissertation, we test the rules used in this region.  We test their effectiveness at 
reducing prices, at keeping prices close to marginal cost, and at allowing prices during 
times of high demand to be high enough to induce adequate generation investment and 
“peak-shaving” power conservation.  We also test whether they affect the extent to 
which generation units with higher operating cost are sometimes used in place of units 
with lower operating cost. 
Concern about the effects of greenhouse gas emissions poses a different sort of 
challenge.  In order to decide what policies to adopt in response to this challenge, it is 
useful for policymakers to know what the effects of these policies are likely to be.  
Incentive-based regulatory mechanisms such as cap-and-trade programs and emission 
fees are being considered on a massive scale, such as in large regions of the United 
States and at the national level in the United States.  In chapter 2, we examine the 
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effect of an incentive-based mechanism for regulating carbon dioxide emissions from 
the electric power industry, using northeastern North America as our region of study.  
Our analysis applies equally to a cap-and-trade program or an emission fee, since 
either puts a price on emissions.  We predict the effect of an incentive-based 
mechanism, with four different levels of stringency, on emissions and on the cost of 
operating the electricity supply system. 
We make these predictions under two different scenarios, the “uniform 
regulation scenario” and the “regulated subregion scenario.”  In the uniform regulation 
scenario, the price on emissions applies in the entire modeled region.  This simulates a 
continental policy or a national policy that includes provisions to prevent effects 
across national boundaries.  In the regulated subregion scenario, the price on 
emissions applies only in a part of the region, a part that corresponds approximately to 
the ten states participating in The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI).  RGGI 
is a cap-and-trade program that will begin limiting the aggregate carbon dioxide 
emissions from power plants in ten US states, starting in 2009.  US federal law 
governing inter-state commerce makes it difficult to prevent RGGI from resulting in 
increased imports of power to those ten states from neighboring states.  As a result, 
carbon dioxide emissions in the neighboring states are likely to increase.  This is 
known as “leakage” because some emissions are shifted out of the regulated region 
rather than being eliminated.  In the regulated subregion scenario, we predict the effect 
of a regional incentive-based mechanism, specifically RGGI, on leakage as well as on 
the cost of operating the power supply system. 
Ours is not the first analysis to estimate these effects.  ICF (2007) estimated 
them in an analysis for the governments of the RGGI states.  However, ICF used a 
model of the power system in which the northeast is divided into regions, there is a 
fixed flow constraint between each pair of adjacent regions, and power flows on the 
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shortest path from source to point of use.  In reality, a much more complex set of 
constraints and flow equations governs the operation of the electric power system, 
which is an alternating-current system.  One of the most important sets of constraints 
is voltage constraints:  voltage must be maintained within acceptable limits and more 
expensive plants must often be operated in order to achieve this.  Furthermore, rather 
than flowing on the shortest or least congested path from source to point of use, power 
flows along multiple lines, potentially including already-congested lines, in 
accordance with Kirchoff’s Law.  The resulting constraints and flow equations affect 
which set of generation units satisfies electricity demand at the lowest cost in each 
moment.  Consequently, these constraints and flow equations also play a major role in 
determining the effects of a carbon-dioxide emission regulation on emissions, cost, 
prices, fuel use, and leakage. 
To more realistically model these effects, we use an alternating-current model 
of the electric supply system, with all of the kinds of flow equations and constraints 
that govern the actual system.  To our knowledge, we are the first to use an 
alternating-current model for the purpose of estimating the effects of an environmental 
regulation. 
Chapter 3 deals with group decision-making when the options involve costs 
followed by benefits.  Government policy decisions regarding education, 
infrastructure, environmental protection, health, and the military deal with such 
options.  Increasingly, energy policy decisions deal with such options, for two reasons.  
First, epidemiological studies now indicate that fine particle, ground-level ozone, and 
mercury pollution from fuel combustion have long-term effects on the health of those 
exposed.  Second, there is now widespread concern about negative effects of current 
carbon dioxide emissions from the energy sector on people and the environment for 
hundreds of years into the future.  Consequently, energy policy decisions that reduce 
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emissions at some cost in the near term appear likely to produce benefits for decades 
or centuries to come. 
The specific phenomenon we investigate in chapter 3 is known as time 
inconsistency.  An individual exhibits time inconsistency if his preferences over a set 
of outcomes change as a function of only his reference point in time relative to the 
outcomes.  As an illustration, suppose that we could ask a person either in January or 
in February whether he would like to spend less and invest more in February.  If he 
would honestly answer yes in January but no in February, in spite of there being no 
unanticipated change in circumstances, then this would be a case of time 
inconsistency.   
Previous experiments have established that individuals exhibit time 
inconsistency in making decisions that apply only to themselves individually, but no 
experiment has heretofore tested with real money whether they exhibit time 
inconsistency in making group, majority-rule decisions, and whether the tendency for 
time inconsistency is attenuated in such decisions.  Chapter 3 reports on an experiment 
that tests these hypotheses, finding that the male participants in our experiment do 
indeed appear to exhibit time inconsistency in group decisions, while the female 
participants do not.  As further evidence that time inconsistency may exist in group 
decisions, we describe past government decision sequences in which governments 
have first approved a policy with costs followed by benefits, then later rejected it 
closer to the time of potential implementation. 
This finding may have important implications for public policymaking.  As 
chapter 3 shows, time inconsistency in group decisions can result in a loss of social 
welfare.  Furthermore, this is not an idle observation because, as chapter 3 explains, 
when decision-makers are time inconsistent, there may be measures that they or others 
5 
can take to either promote or prevent a decision in favor of a policy with costs 
followed by benefits. 
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CHAPTER ONE:  
AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF NEW YORK’S NOVEL REGULATIONS ON 
WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY PRICES1 
1.  Introduction 
New York State is one of many jurisdictions around the US and the world that 
have a “deregulated” electricity market.  However, New York City and neighboring 
West Chester, in the southeastern part of New York State, have few generation owners 
and limited power import capacity.  To prevent the high prices that could result from 
the exercise of market power, the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) 
has imposed an unusual system of price regulations on the owners of generation units 
in this zone of the state, which we shall often refer to simply as “NYC,” bearing in 
mind that we mean New York City as well as West Chester.  In the latest 
Environmental Protection Agency information about this zone, six companies owned 
95% of the generation capacity, as shown in Table 1.1. 
Table 1.1:  Top Six Owners of Generation Capacity in New York City and West 
Chester, 2004 
Company Share of generation capacity 
KeySpan 23% 
Astoria Generating Co LP 20% 
Entergy Nuclear 20% 
NRG Energy 14% 
Power Authority of State of NY 12% 
Consolidated Edison Co-NY Inc 6% 
Source:  Environmental Protection Agency (2007) 
                                                 
1 Daniel L. Shawhan, Department of Economics, Sage Lab, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 110 8th St, 
Troy NY 12180, USA; Kent D. Messer, 226 Townsend Hall, Department of Food & Resource 
Economics, University of Delaware, Newark DE 19716, USA; Richard E. Schuler, Department of 
Economics, Uris Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca NY 14853, USA; and William D. Schulze, 
Department of Applied Economics and Management, Warren Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca NY 
14853, USA. 
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New York’s basic electricity market is standard for a deregulated electricity 
market in the United States:  it uses a type of statewide, last-accepted-offer auction.  
As in other regions with deregulated electricity markets, this auction is a “smart 
market” (McCabe, Rassenti, and Smith 1991) in the sense that the “locational marginal 
price” of electricity can vary from one location to another because transmission 
constraints and losses make the marginal cost of supplying electricity to some 
locations greater than the marginal cost of supplying electricity to others.  
Furthermore, as in other deregulated electricity markets, each unit able to operate must 
offer to do so, and must offer to do so at some price no greater than an offer cap of 
$1000 per megawatt-hour (MWh).  What is unusual is that the NYISO uses an 
automatic mitigation procedure for electricity asking prices or “offers.”  The offers 
submitted by the generation owners are subject to a “conduct screen” and an “impact 
screen.”  If at least one offer violates the conduct screen and the offers in the market 
collectively violate the impact screen, the system operator replaces all offers violating 
the conduct screen with their “reference offers.”  As will be explained later, the 
reference offer for a unit is often based on the average of recently accepted offers from 
that unit during time periods without transmission congestion into or within NYC.  An 
offer fails the conduct screen if it exceeds its corresponding reference offer by more 
than a specified amount that we will call the “allowable margin.”  The offers 
collectively fail the impact screen if replacement of those offers failing the conduct 
screen would reduce the market-clearing price by more than the amount of the 
allowable margin. 
It is difficult to assess the performance of NYC-style regulations theoretically, 
even with knowledge of the generation owners and the marginal cost of each of their 
generation units.  Since the electricity market is repeated each day by the same 
participants, there is a wide range of Nash equilibria (Tirole 1988 pp. 246–247). 
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Empirical data about NYC-area electricity offers, costs, and prices could 
provide another means of assessing the performance of the NYC-style regulations.  
However, much of these data are confidential, and the cost data within them allow 
only estimates of marginal cost rather than exact knowledge of marginal costs.  
Furthermore, these data say little about how the NYC-style regulations would perform 
if adopted in a different jurisdiction. 
We instead use an experiment to assess the performance of the regulations.  
We are able to vary the design parameters and to know the exact marginal costs of 
generation.  We test a simplified version of the NYC-style regulations in two variants 
of a simplified, simulated electricity market with six sellers and fixed demand.  In both 
variants, “off-peak” periods alternate with “on-peak” periods.  On-peak periods 
simulate transmission-system congestion by dividing the six sellers into two smaller 
markets with three sellers each.  The two variants differ only in off-peak demand.  The 
variant with higher off-peak demand may be taken as an “acid test” of the NYC-style 
mechanism, examining its performance at times or places that have high demand 
relative to supply even during hours without transmission congestion.  This may be the 
case in the many parts of the world with severe shortages of generation capacity.  It 
may also apply where congestion does not coincide exactly with high demand.   
In each of the two market variants, we compare the results under the NYC-
style regulations to the results under a more lax system, common in US deregulated 
electricity markets.  This more lax system, which we refer to as the system “without 
NYC-style regulations,” consists only of two rules:  that each unit able to operate must 
offer to do so, and that each unit must offer to do so at some price no greater than an 
offer cap of $1000 per MWh.  These are in fact a strict subset of the NYC-style 
regulations.  We also compare the results both with and without the NYC-style 
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regulations to the counterfactual results that would have occurred if all generation 
units had submitted offers equal to variable cost. 
We conclude that the NYC-style regulations can lower the average market 
price of electricity.  The NYC-style regulations did so in both the treatment with low 
off-peak demand and the treatment with high off-peak demand.  However, if market 
power is sufficiently high even during periods without transmission congestion into or 
within the region subject to the regulations, in our case because of high off-peak 
demand, market prices can still be significantly higher under NYC-style price 
regulations than they would be if each unit’s offer equaled its marginal cost. 
By design, the NYC-style regulations may keep market prices close to the 
marginal cost of supply.  Under these regulations, “peaker” units, which have high 
marginal cost and consequently operate little of the time, are unlikely to be able to 
recover their fixed costs.  Similarly, “peak-shaving” measures for reducing demand 
during times of high demand are less likely to be worthwhile to those who could 
implement them.  As a result, the NYC-style regulations may prevent adequate 
investment in peakers and peak-shaving measures.  In the absence of some other 
intervention to ensure adequate peakers and peak-shaving measures2, the result will be 
blackouts, which are very costly in terms of lost productivity. 
Kiesling and Wilson (2007) and Entriken and Wan (2005) also each test an 
automatic mitigation procedure (AMP), but the procedures they test lack an essential 
characteristic of New York’s AMP, which is that the reference offers can move over 
time.  In Kiesling and Wilson’s test and in Entriken and Wan’s test, the reference 
offers are fixed.  Kiesling and Wilson’s experiment is interesting because it examines 
the effect of a type of AMP on investment in new generation capacity.  Entriken and 
                                                 
2 New York and some other jurisdictions have such an intervention, known as the “installed capacity 
market.”  It provides an annual payment to generators for offering their generation into the electricity 
market, regardless of how often they actually operate. 
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Wan’s simulation is interesting because it tests another kind of AMP using computer 
agents instead of human experiment participants.  However, neither is a test of New 
York’s AMP.  In addition, neither examines whether the mechanism changes the 
extent to which higher-marginal-cost units are used in place of lower-marginal-cost 
units. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 describes the 
regulatory regime and power generation industry in New York City and West Chester.  
Section 3 describes our experiment.  Section 4 presents the results.  Section 5 
concludes. 
2.  Price Regulations in NYC and in Our Experiment 
The price regulations we examine in this paper apply to the power generation 
units that are located in NYC and that sell electrical energy into the NYISO wholesale 
electricity market.  We reproduced those regulations in the experiment,3 with some 
modifications summarized in the description below. 
In NYC as in our experiment, offers are subject to a conduct screen and an 
impact screen.  The conduct screen applies to offers individually, while the impact 
screen applies to the offers in NYC collectively. 
An offer fails the conduct screen if it exceeds what we call a “threshold.”  The 
threshold for each unit, each hour, is the unit’s then-current “reference offer” plus the 
allowable margin that applies during that minute.  The allowable margin depends on 
whether there is or is not currently transmission congestion into or within NYC.  In 
minutes when there is, the NYISO sets the allowable margin at a number between $3 
and $24, depending on the time of year.  We use an allowable margin of $13 during 
the on-peak rounds in our experiment, since they represent the market when there is 
                                                 
3 Materials available by emailing shawhd@rpi.edu. 
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congestion.  In hours when there is not congestion, the allowable margin is the lesser 
of $100 or three times the unit’s reference offer.  We simply use $100 in the 
experiment. 
In the NYISO wholesale electricity market, offers are hourly in the sense that a 
generation owner can submit a different offer for one hour than for the next.  The 
reference offer for each unit is updated daily and is the mean of the “eligible” hourly 
offers from that unit in the preceding 90 days, provided there have been at least ten 
eligible hourly offers within those 90 days.  In the experiment, to allow reference 
offers to change, we instead use the mean of the last two eligible offers, provided there 
have been at least two in the last 20 rounds.   
To be eligible, an offer must have been accepted in the sense that the system 
operator chose to purchase electricity from that unit in that hour on the basis of that 
offer.  In addition, there must not have been transmission congestion into or within 
NYC during that hour, and the offers in the market, collectively, must not have failed 
the impact screen4 during that hour.  In the experiment, the no-congestion requirement 
is represented by a requirement that the round must be an “off-peak” round, since the 
off-peak rounds in the experiment represent the hours in NYC with no congestion.   
If, for a particular unit, there have been at least ten hours of eligible offers 
during the last 90 days, then the reference offer for that unit in the real New York 
mechanism equals the lesser of the mean and median of the unit’s eligible offers from 
the last 90 days.  If there have been fewer than ten during the last 90 days, the 
reference offer instead equals the NYISO’s estimate of the unit’s marginal cost of 
generation.  To permit the NYISO to produce these estimates, unit owners are 
periodically required to submit an accounting of their expenditures for fuel and other 
                                                 
4 Failing the impact screen implies that the NYISO replaced at least one offer, and vice versa.  We 
mention this here because in the experiment instructions, we explained this criterion for an “eligible” 
offer in terms of offer replacement rather than in terms of failing the impact screen. 
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determinants of marginal cost.  In the experiment, the reference offer for a unit starts 
at the unit’s marginal cost of generation.  If there have been at least two eligible offers 
from a particular unit during the last 20 rounds (or since the experiment began if less 
than 20 rounds ago), then the reference offer for that unit equals the mean of the unit’s 
last two eligible offers.  If not, then the reference offer of the unit reverts to the unit’s 
marginal cost. 
The impact screen relies on the following process:  The NYISO calculates the 
system-wide average locational marginal price (LMP) based on the offers submitted.  
Then it calculates what the system-wide average LMP would be if all offers failing the 
conduct screen were replaced with their respective reference offers.  If the former 
exceeds the latter by more than the allowable margin (the same allowable margin used 
in the conduct screen and described four paragraphs above), the offers fail the impact 
screen.  If the offers fail the impact screen, the NYISO replaces all offers failing the 
conduct screen with their respective reference offers.   
In addition to the screens just described, there are at least two other constraints 
on the offer behavior of the generation units in NYC, as mentioned in the introduction.  
First, each must offer to produce power equal to or greater than its claimed capacity 
unless it has a problem that prevents that or it is undergoing approved maintenance.  In 
other words, no unit can “withhold” its output.  The NYISO has a branch, with 30 
staff, tasked with promptly visiting any unit suspected of withholding, to ensure 
compliance with the no-withholding regulation.  Second, as is common in other 
deregulated electricity markets in the US, the maximum allowable offer is $1000. 
3.  Description of Experiment  
As discussed in the introduction, we designed the experiment to test of the type 
of price regulation system used in NYC.  We simplified the market and the regulations 
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somewhat so that the participants could understand and complete the experiment in 
under two hours.  However, we sought to retain the essential features of the 
regulations and of electricity markets. 
In the experiment, Cornell students, primarily undergraduate economics and 
business students, played the role of owners of generation units (or simply “units”).  
Each unit had a capacity of 100 MW.  It produced either 100 MW or nothing, 
depending on whether the owner successfully sold its output in that round.  The 
participants had to submit an offer for each unit each round, and could choose any 
whole-number offer price greater than $0 but no more than $1,000. 
The experiment alternated between “off-peak” and “on-peak” rounds.  Demand 
in all rounds was perfectly inelastic5.  Compared with an on-peak round, an off-peak 
round combined lower demand with more competitors per market (to simulate less 
transmission congestion) and fewer units available to operate (to simulate the higher 
rate of maintenance that occurs during weeks of low demand and to keep an 
appropriate relationship between supply and demand).   
In off-peak rounds, there were six generation owners in each market.  Each 
generation owner controlled three units, with marginal costs of $30, $50, and $80 per 
MW per round, respectively.  In on-peak rounds, each market of six generation owners 
split up into two separate submarkets with three generation owners in each submarket, 
to simulate the effect of transmission congestion into and within NYC.  However, in 
these two submarkets, each generation owner controlled six units, two each with 
marginal costs of $30, $50, and $80 per MW per round.  This design creates more 
competition among generation owners during off-peak periods, to represent the fact 
that there tends to be less congestion and hence more competition among generation 
owners during off-peak periods.  We grouped each participant with the same five other 
                                                 
5 In reality, demand in electricity markets is not perfectly inelastic, but it is highly inelastic in the short 
term because most customers face a price that changes no more frequently than monthly. 
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participants in every off-peak round and with the same two other participants in every 
on-peak round, though we did not reveal who was grouped with whom. 
There were four treatments, with thirty participants in each.  No individual 
participated more than once.  Two treatments were “conventional demand treatments.”  
In them, the ratio of demand to generation capacity was 1:2 during each off-peak 
round and 5:6 during each on-peak round.  The other two treatments were “high off-
peak demand treatments.”  In them, the ratio of demand to generation capacity was 5:6 
during both off-peak and on-peak rounds.  However, the off-peak rounds still featured 
more competition because there were six generation owners in each market, compared 
with three generation owners in each market during the on-peak rounds.  Table 1.2 
summarizes the types of rounds in both the conventional demand and high off-peak 
demand treatments. 
Table 1.2:  Types of Rounds 
Type of round Units available to each 
generation owner (each 
unit has capacity of 100 
MW) 
Total generation 
capacity per group 
of 6 generation 
owners 
Demand 
(perfectly 
inelastic) 
Off-peak rounds 
in conventional 
demand 
treatments 
3 units, with marginal 
generation costs of $30, 
$50, and $80, respectively 
6 owners x 3 units x 
100 MW = 1,800 
MW 
900 MW 
Off-peak rounds 
in high off-peak 
demand 
treatments 
Same as above Same as above 1,500 MW 
On-peak rounds 
in all treatments 
6 units, 2 with each of the 
following marginal 
generation costs: $30, 
$50, $80 
2 submarkets x 3 
owners x 6 units x 
100 MW = 3,600 
MW 
3,000 MW 
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Aside from the off-peak demand, the other condition that varied between 
treatments was the presence or absence of NYC-style price regulations.  One 
conventional demand treatment and one high off-peak demand treatment were 
“without NYC-style regulations” because the only price regulations were the rule 
against withholding and a $1000 cap on offers.  The other two treatments were “with 
NYC-style regulations” because the rest of the NYC-style price regulations, 
specifically AMP, also applied.  In summary, we used a two-by-two design in which 
the two conditions we varied were off-peak demand and price regulations. 
The participants earned a small fraction of a real dollar for each dollar of 
experimental earnings.  We set the exchange rate for each treatment to equal our a 
priori guess at the exchange rate that would produce mean US dollar earnings of $25 
per participant in that treatment.  Though we did not tell the participants until after the 
end of the fiftieth round, the experiment lasted 50 rounds. 
4.  Results 
We base our inferences on the mean market prices in rounds 31–49.  As one 
can see from inspecting the plots in Figures 1.1 and 1.2, the market prices in some 
treatments had a trend.  We submit that the results in the rounds toward the end of the 
experiment, such as rounds 31–49, are the best indicator we have of what the prices 
would be in a setting of indefinite repetition, as in real electricity markets. 
For statistical testing, we use the round 31–49 means in each group of six 
participants, shown in Tables 1.3 and 1.4.  We use one-tailed Wilcoxon rank sum tests.  
We use these non-parametric tests rather than t-tests because the group means may not 
be normally distributed. 
17 
 
 
 Without NYC-style regulations With NYC-style regulations 
Figure 1.1:  Mean Market Price by Round, Conventional Demand Treatments 
 
 
 Without NYC-style regulations With NYC-style regulations 
Figure 1.2:  Market Price by Round, High Off-Peak Demand Treatments 
Table 1.3:  Mean Price by Group, Rounds 31–49, Conventional Demand 
Treatments 
With NYC-style regulations  Without NYC-style regulations 
Group Off-peak 
rounds 
On-peak 
rounds 
 Group Off-peak 
rounds 
On-peak 
rounds 
B9.1 50.3 87.1  A9.1 80.3 968.6 
B9.2 50.0 82.1  A9.2 51.1 87.9 
B9.3 53.4 80.5  A9.3 63.7 800.5 
B9.4 78.3 92.4  A9.4 57.4 767.5 
B9.5 50.5 89.7  A9.5 59.8 638.8 
Mean 56.5 86.4  Mean 62.5 652.6 
M
ea
n 
m
ar
ke
t p
ric
e 
M
ea
n 
m
ar
ke
t p
ric
e 
18 
Result 1:  The NYC-style regulations reduced on-peak prices 
As Tables 1.3 and 1.4 show, the mean on-peak price with NYC-style price 
regulations is lower than the on-peak price without NYC-style price regulations.  This 
is true in both the conventional demand treatments and the high off-peak demand 
treatments.  The NYC-style regulations reduced the mean on-peak price from $653 to 
$86 in the conventional demand treatments and from $714 to $200 in the high off-
peak demand treatments.  Both differences are significant at better than the 95% 
confidence level.  We conclude that the NYC-style regulations reduced the prices 
during on-peak rounds. 
Table 1.4:  Mean Price by Group, Rounds 31–49, High Off-Peak Demand 
Treatments 
With NYC-style regulations  Without NYC-style regulations 
Group Off-peak 
rounds 
On-peak 
rounds 
 Group Off-peak 
rounds 
On-peak 
rounds 
B15.1 166.8 129.1  A15.1 107.5 496.4 
B15.2 574.4 484.0  A15.2 365.4 693.8 
B15.3 344.9 209.4  A15.3 304.7 693.7 
B15.4 115.7 98.3  A15.4 165.1 953.3 
B15.5 80.5 81.3  A15.5 443.1 750.2 
Mean 256.5 200.4  Mean 277.2 717.4 
Result 2:  The NYC-style regulations did not significantly change off-peak prices 
There are reasons to believe that the NYC-style price regulations could raise or 
lower the mean prices in off-peak rounds.  First, they could conceivably lower the 
mean prices.  In the off-peak rounds, the NYC-style regulations prevent offers from 
being accepted if those offers are more than $100 higher than the corresponding 
reference offers and if they also increase the market price by more than $100 over the 
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market price that would prevail if all offers equaled their corresponding reference 
offers.  As a result, the NYC-style regulations cap the rate of increase of off-peak 
prices and they limit the potential effect of high, speculative offers on the price in a 
given round.   
Second, the NYC-style regulations could instead increase the mean prices in 
off-peak rounds.  The maximum prices during on-peak rounds are limited by the 
reference offers, which in turn are based on the recent offers during off-peak rounds.  
To raise the maximum prices possible during on-peak rounds, participants must get 
higher offers accepted during off-peak periods.  As a result, the desire for higher on-
peak prices creates an incentive for raising offers during off-peak rounds. 
Instead of significantly raising or lowering off-peak prices, the NYC-style 
regulations had no significant effect on the mean of off-peak prices.  The mean off-
peak price was slightly lower under the NYC-style price regulations in both the 
conventional demand treatments and the high off-peak demand treatments, but in 
neither case was the difference close to being statistically significant at conventional 
levels. 
Result 3:  The NYC-style regulations may not keep prices close to marginal cost in 
some circumstances 
If every offer from every unit equaled the short-run marginal cost of generation 
from that unit, then the market prices would be $50 in the off-peak rounds of the 
conventional load treatments, $80 in the on-peak rounds of those treatments, and $80 
in both kinds of rounds in the high off-peak demand treatments.  We will call these 
levels “marginal cost.”  Under the conventional load treatments, the NYC-style price 
regulations kept the mean market price from rising more than $6.50 above marginal 
cost in both the off-peak and on-peak rounds.  However, in the high off-peak demand 
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treatments, the mean price was $176.5 above marginal cost in the off-peak rounds and 
$120.4 above marginal cost in the on-peak rounds.6  These mean margins above 
marginal cost are larger than those under the conventional load treatments, with a 
confidence level greater than 95%.  We conclude that if generation owners have 
enough market power during the periods when the reference prices are being set (off-
peak rounds in the case of our experiment), they can raise prices well above the 
marginal cost of generation in spite of the NYC-style price regulations. 
Result 4:  The NYC-style regulations may keep on-peak prices too low to incentivize 
the efficient quantity of peaker generation units and “peak-shaving” conservation 
Power generation units are costly to build and install.  In order to recover its 
investment cost from sales of electricity, a generation unit must, when it operates, earn 
an average price that is higher by some margin than its short-run marginal cost.  The 
higher the short-run marginal cost of generation at a particular unit, the less often the 
market price of electricity will be high enough to justify operating that unit.  The less a 
unit is used, the greater is the average margin it must earn above its short-run marginal 
cost of generation.  For example, a peaker may have a levelized capital cost of 
$80,000 per MW per year at the owner’s cost of capital and a short-run marginal 
generation cost of $60 per MWh (Mount, 2007).  If this peaker operates 5% of the 
time (or 438 hours per year), it must earn an average of $182 per MWh more than its 
short-run marginal generation cost.  As a result, in order for all units be profitable 
based on energy sales, including the least-used units, the price must be far above 
marginal cost at least during times of extremely high demand, when even the least-
                                                 
6 The higher price in off-peak than on-peak rounds can be explained by the higher allowable margin 
during off-peak rounds, combined with a desire by participants to raise their reference offers.  If the 
experiment had been long enough for offer to stabilize, we would expect on-peak prices to be higher 
than off-peak prices, though not by much because of the small allowable margin that applies during on-
peak rounds. 
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used units can profit from these extremely high scarcity prices.  However, the NYC-
style regulations cap the market price at the reference price of the marginal unit (when 
units are ranked from lowest to highest reference price) plus the allowable margin.  
During times of high demand, there tends to be congestion into or within New York 
City and West Chester.  As mentioned earlier, when there is congestion, the allowable 
margin is between $3 and $24.  For additional units that may be needed to prevent 
blackouts at times of high demand, this allowable margin is too small to enable the 
additional units to recoup their first costs if peakers are unable to raise their reference 
offers.  In the absence of some other prospective earnings that appear likely to make 
building the units profitable, profit-seeking entities will not build the units.  Similarly, 
fewer “peak-shaving” measures that reduce on-peak electricity demand will be 
profitable if the NYC-style price regulations suppress on-peak prices.  As a result, the 
quantity of peakers and peak-shaving measures may be insufficient to prevent 
blackouts.  It may also be below the socially optimal quantity.  Alternatively, 
generation owners may be able to raise the reference offers of their peakers so that 
they are able to charge prices high enough to recover their first costs and so that a 
more extensive set of peak-shaving investments is profitable.  Our experiment is one 
test of the extent to which generation owners are able to raise the reference offers of 
their peakers under NYC-style price regulations. 
In the experiment, under the conventional load treatments, the participants 
earned a mean of only $86.50 per MW sold during on-peak rounds.  The highest mean 
in any group was $92.40.  Since the marginal cost of generation was $80, this 
indicates that generation owners were able to raise the reference offers of their peakers 
very little under the conventional load treatments.  We conclude that in the absence of 
some intervention to make the expected profits of peakers or peak-shaving 
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conservation profitable, the NYC-style regulations may lead to an inefficiently low 
quantity of both. 
Result 5:  The NYC-style regulations did not significantly change the excess cost from 
out-of-merit-order use of generation units 
The peakers in the experiment were the units with an $80 short-run marginal 
cost of generation.  The NYC-style price regulations create an incentive for generation 
owners to get offers from peakers accepted during off-peak rounds.  This is the only 
way to raise the peakers’ reference offers, since those reference offers are based on 
offers accepted during off-peak rounds.  As a result, the NYC-style price regulations 
could cause generation owners to sell power from peakers in place of power from 
lower-marginal-cost units.  This is known as using generation units “out of merit 
order.”  It results in a loss of economic surplus, as a producer is incurring a higher cost 
than necessary to produce the good. 
Table 1.5 shows the ratio of actual generation cost to minimum generation 
cost, by group.  Using Wilcoxon rank sum tests, the NYC-style price regulations did 
not significantly change the excess cost from out-of-merit-order use of units in either 
the conventional demand treatment or the high off-peak demand treatment. 
5.  Conclusion 
Our experiment tests the effects of the wholesale electricity price regulations 
used in New York City and West Chester, an area with few generation owners and 
limited power import capacity.  These regulations may be considered elsewhere, 
particularly in other areas subject to concerns about the influential exercise of market 
power by owners of power generation units. 
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Table 1.5:  Mean Cost of Generation, as a Ratio of Minimum Possible Cost, 
Rounds 31–48 
Conventional demand treatments High off-peak demand treatments 
With NYC-style 
regulations 
Without NYC-
style regulations 
With NYC-style 
regulations 
Without NYC-
style regulations 
Group Cost Group Cost Group Cost Group Cost 
B9.1 1.0100 A9.1 1.0772 B15.1 1.1106 A15.1 1.0484 
B9.2 1.0038 A9.2 1.0282 B15.2 1.0916 A15.2 1.0622 
B9.3 1.0245 A9.3 1.0477 B15.3 1.0952 A15.3 1.0514 
B9.4 1.0527 A9.4 1.0276 B15.4 1.0617 A15.4 1.0607 
B9.5 1.0358 A9.5 1.0314 B15.5 1.0093 A15.5 1.0782 
Mean 1.0254 Mean 1.0424 Mean 1.0737 Mean 1.0602 
 
Under a demand pattern designed represent a conventional pattern of 
electricity demand (i.e. in the “conventional demand treatments”), on-peak electricity 
prices were significantly lower under the NYC-style regulations than without them.  
The mean on-peak price during rounds 31–49 was 716% above marginal cost without 
the NYC-style regulations, but only 8% above marginal cost when the NYC-style 
regulations were in place.  The NYC-style regulations did not have a statistically 
significant effect on off-peak prices, which were 25% above marginal cost without the 
NYC-style regulations and 13% above marginal cost with them. 
The on-peak prices that prevailed under the NYC-style regulations have the 
potential to be too low in the sense that high on-peak prices may be necessary to 
induce adequate investment in generation capacity and “peak-shaving” energy 
conservation. 
We also tested the NYC-style regulations under a different demand pattern (the 
“high off-peak demand treatments”), in which demand remains high relative to load 
24 
even during times without transmission-system congestion.  In these treatments, the 
NYC-style regulations did significantly reduce the mean on-peak price in rounds 31–
49, from $717 without the regulations to $200 with them.  However, the NYC-style 
regulations did not keep electricity prices nearly as close to marginal cost as they did 
under the conventional demand treatments.  The mean price was 221% above marginal 
cost in the off-peak rounds and 150% above marginal cost in the on-peak rounds.  The 
high off-peak market power that produced these results may apply in the many parts of 
the world with severe shortages of generation capacity or with very few generation 
ownrs.  It may also apply where congestion does not coincide exactly with high 
demand so that high demand occurs at times when reference offers are being set.  Our 
result from these treatments indicates that in such places, the NYC-style regulations 
may not prevent the mean price of generation from rising well above marginal cost. 
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CHAPTER TWO:  
AN ECONOMIC AND ENGINEERING ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF 
CARBON DIOXIDE REGULATION ON EMISSIONS AND COSTS FROM 
ELECTRIC POWER1  
1.  Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the impacts and outcomes of carbon 
dioxide (CO2) regulation on the electric power industry using an integrated economic 
and engineering approach that incorporates a full alternating current (AC) model of 
transmission for northeastern North America. The reason for conducting such an 
integrated analysis rather than using simplified assumptions about transmission is well 
illustrated by the California experience where markets were designed and introduced 
on the assumption that transmission constraints were relatively unimportant. In fact, 
transmission constraints proved fatal to that market design, making the market much 
less competitive than economists initially assumed.  Another example is the Northeast 
power outage that occurred in August of 2003. Markets in Ohio (unlike the rest of the 
Northeast) were not designed to provide incentives for generators to assist in 
maintaining voltage (a public good).  This design flaw, which resulted from a failure 
to consider the requirements of an AC network, proved to be a major factor in the 
collapse of the system.  Simply put, in a contest between physics and economics, 
physics wins.   
This chapter is organized as follows: The second section reviews current and 
proposed legislation at the national and regional level for regulation of CO2.  The third 
section presents the optimization/simulation model and network used in the analysis. 
The fourth section presents results from the simulation model which allows analysis of 
                                                 
1 Daniel L. Shawhan, Department of Economics, Sage Lab, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 110 8th St, 
Troy NY 12180; Douglas C. Mitarotonda, PhD student, Department of Economics, Uris Hall, Cornell 
University, Ithaca NY 14853; and Ray Zimmerman, Department of Electrical and Computer 
Engineering, Phillips Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca NY 14853. 
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the effects of various CO2 prices either from a cap and trade program or a carbon tax 
on the cost of operating the system, emissions inside the regulated region, and 
emissions outside the regulated region.  The study shows that outcomes depend 
critically not only on the transmission constraints in the system but also on whether 
the simulation uses a simplified linear approximation (called a DC approximation 
since flows can be modeled by linear equations in a direct current network) or the 
more realistic non-linear AC network that includes constraints on voltage.  These 
additional more complex constraints that arise in AC modeling (DC modeling ignores 
the fact that voltage, a public good, must be kept within bounds or equipment damage 
results) become especially important when the network is operated in new ways such 
as will occur when CO2 charges change the historic mix of generation and fuel type, 
no longer using what was the cheapest mix of power.  The prior study of the emission 
and price effects of RGGI (see ICF 2007) used a simplified representation of 
transmission that just constrains flows between regions—a pipeline representation.  In 
fact, electricity flows do not behave in a manner consistent with the point-to-point 
pipeline analogy.  Instead, power from a particular source flows along multiple lines, 
potentially including already-congested lines, in accordance with Kirchoff’s Law.   
A major issue that arises in attempts by various regions to independently begin 
control of CO2, in the absence of a national program, is the possibility of “leakage.”  
That is, by increasing the price of electricity in the regions where it applies, CO2 
regulation may increase imports of electricity from unregulated to regulated regions, 
either reducing the effectiveness of regulation in reducing CO2 or, in the worst case, 
increasing total CO2 emissions.  Clearly, an accurate model of transmission is needed 
to examine this issue.  Additionally, issues of cost, elasticity of demand for permits, 
etc., also require accurate modeling of transmission.  This study represents a first step 
in that analysis.  
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2.  Current and Proposed Legislation 
This section will first describe the leading contender for US national 
legislation, the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act (LWCSA). Then, the various 
regional initiatives will be identified and one, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 
will be described in detail since it forms the basis for part of our case study that is able 
to contrast regional to national legislation.   
The LWCSA proposes the following greenhouse gas (GHG) reductions over 
time: 
•  By 2012: reduce to 2005 levels 
•  By 2020, reduce to 10% below 2005 levels 
•  By 2030, reduce to 30% below 2005 levels 
•  By 2040, reduce to 50% below 2005 levels 
•  By 2050, reduce to 70% below 2005 levels 
These reductions will be achieved through a cap and trade program.  States can 
adopt any standard, cap, limitation, or prohibition relating to emissions but these must 
be at least as stringent.  The auction is scheduled to start in 2012 and the use of offsets 
(credits earned from emission reduction activities outside the scope of the RGGI 
regulations, such as tree planting or reducing emissions from a facility in another 
country) is limited to 15%.  Additional allowances can be released in the first 2 years 
if problems arise.  Then, borrowing is allowed only as needed to avoid significant 
harm to the economy. 
Several studies have shown that allocating pollution permits for free results in 
windfall gains to polluting industries.  Free distribution of permits is limited in the 
LWCSA to 20%, declining to 0% by 2035, in each of the following sectors: 
• Electric Power 
• Industrial 
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• Transportation 
Free permits would be issued to others as follows:  
• Utility distribution companies: 10% 
• Regulated entities with early reductions 5% in 2012, down to 0% by 
2017 
• State governments: 5%  
The LWCSA passed the Senate Environmental and Public Works Committee 
in December of 2007 on a vote of 11-8, and came to the Senate floor in June of 2008 
but failed because there were insufficient votes to defeat a filibuster, falling 12 votes 
shy of cloture. There were also insufficient votes to defeat a threatened presidential 
veto.  The bill is likely to be introduced again in 2009.  Figure 2.1 shows how the 
LWCSA climate change targets compare to other proposed legislative initiatives.  
In addition to this federal legislation, three regional cap and trade initiatives are 
underway as shown in Figure 2.2.  Note that these three initiatives comprise 37 
percent of US emissions.  The states in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(RGGI) contain 16% of the US population (Grenfell, 2008) but emit only 10% of US 
GHG emissions, in part because of the RGGI region’s electricity generation mix that 
uses relatively less coal than some other areas.  
In this study we focus on the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative because of 
the availability of an existing network model that can explore many issues that have 
been raised concerning CO2 regulation.  RGGI has ten member states shown in Figure 
2.3, importantly excluding Pennsylvania that has a substantial availability of coal fired 
generation.  RGGI proposes to reduce power-sector CO2 emissions 10% from the 2009 
level, between 2009 and 2018.  Note that it is significantly less stringent than the 
LWCSA. 
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Figure 2.1:  Comparison of Legislative Climate Change Targets in the 110th 
Congress, as of December 7, 2007.  Source:  Larsen and Heilmayr 2007. 
 
RGGI   = 10% of US total GHG emissions 
MW      = 14% 
West    = 13% 
TOTAL:  37% 
Figure 2.2:  Total GHG Emissions of States Participating in Prospective Regional 
GHG Cap and Trade Initiatives  Source: Damassa, 2007.  Notes from source: 
“GHG emission totals from Canadian Provinces participating in the Midwest 
Accord and WCI are not included here. MtCO2e is million metric tons of carbon 
dioxide equivalent per year. Percentages are of total U.S. emissions.” 
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Figure 2.3:  Member States of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative.  Map 
from http://www.awm.delaware.gov/Info/Regs/Pages/RGGI.aspx.  Accessed July 
26, 2008. 
In the 2009–2014 interval, emissions will be capped at 2009 levels.  From 
2015–2019 the cap is reduced by 2.5% per year.  Currently, 6 states plan to auction off 
100% of their permits.  The others are required to auction at least 25% of permits.  
Auction revenue will be used for consumer benefits including energy efficiency 
programs.  A three-year compliance or “true up” period will be enforced unless the 
trigger price of $10 is reached in which case this period can be extended.  Offset usage 
is limited to 3.3% unless the trigger price reached, so that, if permits reach $10/ton, 
there will be no limit on offset use. 
As noted above, one of the main worries for all of the regional programs is 
“leakage.” As generators inside regulated areas are forced to pay for CO2 permits, 
their prices will rise compared to the prices offered by generators outside of the 
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regulated region.  Imports from cheaper coal fired power plants outside of RGGI states 
may cause emissions to increase outside of RGGI states more than emissions decrease 
in RGGI states.  In what follows, we test this hypothesis as well as demonstrating 
what happens if all of the Northeastern states and provinces are regulated in a national 
program. 
3.  The Simulation Model and Network 
The usual approach for modeling transmission is to employ DC modeling (e.g. 
GE MAPS, PowerWorld, etc.) which provides a linear approximation to the actual 
behavior of the non-linear AC system used in the real world.  There are several major 
deficiencies in this computationally simplified approach.  First, voltage is ignored so 
there are no voltage constraints that must be in place for the system to operate.  In 
managing day-to-day operation, proxy limits are employed to maintain voltage.  These 
proxy limits are limits placed on the flow through lines in DC models that are not 
based on actual line capacity but are rather based on observed decreases in voltage that 
occur when too much flow is allowed through actual lines.  This approach will not 
work for CO2 regulation because permit prices or CO2 taxes could easily alter 
operation of system sufficiently that existing proxy limits derived from real world 
experience may no longer approximate needed voltage constraints.  A second factor is 
that the transmission prices derived from DC optimal power flows are always 
incorrect and may lead to mis-allocation of resources and inefficiency.  In this study, 
MATPOWER, a full AC optimization/simulation framework developed at Cornell 
University, is used to study the Northeast power system’s response to CO2 regulation.  
Figure 2.4 shows the mathematical formulation of MATPOWER that is fully 
described at http://www.pserc.cornell.edu/matpower/.    
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Figure 2.4:  The Formulation of MATPOWER 
MATPOWER minimizes the cost of operating the electric power system 
subject to the demands and availability of electricity at each node and the transmission 
capability of the lines in the system and voltage requirements.  Costs of purchasing 
carbon permits or carbon taxes are incorporated in the optimization.  The simulation 
works by using representative hours and solving the optimization with different CO2 
emission prices.  The current study does not consider reliability so no contingencies 
are incorporated in the analysis at this stage and only existing generation is 
incorporated with no investment decisions at this stage of the analysis. 
Figure 2.4 shows the mathematical formulation of MATPOWER.  In that 
formulation, there are two groups of optimization variables, labeled x and z. The x 
variables are the optimal power flow variables, consisting of the voltage angles θ and 
voltage magnitudes V at each “bus” or node in the network, and real and reactive 
generator injections Pg and Qg at generators g = 1,2,3,…. 
The transmission lines and nodes or “buses” of the physical network 
representation utilized in the study are shown in Figure 2.5.  The network includes 
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only PJM-East (New Jersey, Delaware, Washington DC, and most of Pennsylvania 
and Maryland), New York, New England, Ontario, Quebec, and the Maritime 
Provinces.  Allen, Lang, and Ilic (2008) developed this network representation as a 
simplified version of the northeast power grid, which has thousands of buses.  Their 
simplified representation aggregates the thousands of actual buses in the Northeast 
into 36 buses, and specifies the electrical characteristics of those 36 buses and the 
aggregated lines that connect them.  The simplified network is “…intended to be a test 
system for algorithms and software, as opposed to a study system of the Northeastern 
US bulk electric power system.”  However, it approximates thermal, voltage, and 
reactive power constraints of the real system and “…some of the major intra- and 
inter-area congestion patterns are preserved….”  Ilic (2008) has reported that in 
comparisons between the simplified model and a detailed model of the same region, 
the simplified model produces results very similar to those of the detailed model.  
Given that no completed study of CO2 regulation includes a network, with an AC or 
DC model, it is at least reasonable to examine the issues raised by CO2 regulation 
using an available AC network model. 
The optimization problem associated with determining the operation of an AC 
network has more constraints than a DC system and is non-linear and complex.  
Consequently, using a simplified representation of the network is necessary because it 
allows us to solve for the operation of the system.    
Table 2.1 shows both the marginal costs and emissions characteristics of the 
generator types used in the pilot runs.  Allen, Lang, and Ilic specify only the total 
quantity of gas fired generation.  We assume that half of it is “efficient” and the other 
half “inefficient.” 
In what follows, results are based on a set of pilot runs that are simplistic in 
that only two levels of demand (“load”) are considered, low and high.  Demand is 
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assumed to be fixed, since few electricity customers face real-time electricity prices.  
We assume the low load two thirds of the time and the high load one third of the time.  
One purpose of the pilot is to see if model converges at high and low loads.  The final 
runs, which will be presented in future publications, will have 20 or more 
representative load-availability combinations.   
The CO2 prices we consider are $0, $5, $120, and $250 per tonne.  The $120 
and $250 prices are much higher than the $10 trigger price that allows firms to use 
offsets for any proportion of the RGGI emission reduction requirements, so we do not 
expect to see such high prices under RGGI.  However, because we have not yet 
incorporated a detailed representation of the thousands of generators in the Northeast 
into the model, we do not yet have fine gradations of marginal costs and emission 
rates, so our model is not yet valid for estimating the effects of small changes in 
emission prices.  Nonetheless, the use of such high emission prices still achieves most 
of the objectives of this study because it predicts the ceiling of emission reductions 
that can be expected from a change in operation of the existing Northeast power 
system under RGGI and provides a case study of the effect of AC versus DC modeling 
of environmental regulations applied to the power sector.  Given the marginal costs 
and emission rates in Table 2.1, the $120 price makes the short-run marginal cost of 
efficient gas fired generation lower than that of coal fired generation.  The $250 price 
makes short-run marginal cost of all gas fired generation lower than that of coal fired 
generation. 
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Figure 2.5:  Physical Network Used in Our Simulation.  Source: Allen, Lang, and Ilic 2008. 
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Table 2.1:  Marginal Costs and Emissions per MWh, Used in Our Simulation 
 Marginal cost  
per MWh 
Tonnes CO2  
per MWh 
Nuclear, hydro, wind, refuse $0 0 
Coal $23.70 0.94 
Efficient gas $54 0.43 
Inefficient gas $81 0.65 
Oil $96.30 0.93 
4.  Simulation Results 
The right-most column of Table 2.2 shows the results of our alternating-current 
simulation of the effect of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative on carbon dioxide 
emissions from the electric power sector in the modeled region.  Each number in the 
table is a weighted average of the two representative hours that we model, one with 
high demand and one with low demand.  At each of the three CO2 emission prices we 
consider, $5, $120, and $250, the policy reduces emissions inside the regulated region 
but increases emissions by a larger amount outside of the regulated region.  The 
predicted effect of the cap-and-trade program in the RGGI CO2 emission reduction 
policy is to actually increase CO2 emissions.  The policy does this by decreasing 
generation from natural gas inside the regulated region and increasing generation from 
coal outside the regulated region. 
However, this analysis ignores two other components of the RGGI policy that 
should reduce CO2 emissions.  First, power plant owners in the RGGI region may 
satisfy some of the emission reduction requirements by purchasing offsets.  Second, 
the states may use some of the revenues from the sale of RGGI emission permits to 
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fund programs that help energy customers to improve their energy efficiency and 
consequently to reduce their CO2 emissions. 
Table 2.2:  Change in Emissions as % of Emissions in RGGI, if No Charge on 
Imports 
CO2 price  DC model AC model 
$5 
 
Inside RGGI 
Outside RGGI 
Total 
0% 
0% 
0% 
-1.03% 
1.07% 
0.04% 
$120 
 
Inside RGGI 
Outside RGGI 
Total 
-13.2% 
23.9% 
10.7% 
-10.9% 
15.3% 
4.3% 
$250 
 
Inside RGGI 
Outside RGGI 
Total 
-14.9% 
24.3% 
9.5% 
-11.6% 
15.5% 
3.9% 
 
For comparison, we also present results of a simulation that is similar but uses 
a linear, direct-current model of the power system rather than the more realistic 
alternating-current model.  This DC model predicts no change of emissions with a $5 
CO2 price.  With a $120 or $250 price, the DC model predicts total changes of CO2 
emissions that are more than twice as great as those predicted by the AC model.  It 
appears that AC modeling can make an important difference in the results. 
The voltage constraints in the AC model may be an important reason why its 
results differ from the results of using the DC model.  In the solution in the AC 
simulation, the voltage constraints were binding at approximately half of the buses 
with low load and two thirds of the buses with high load. 
Next, we predict the effect of a CO2 emission tax or cap-and-trade program if it 
were applied to the entire region encompassed by the physical network in our 
simulation.  Leakage is no longer possible because the entire power supply and 
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demand system modeled is now subject to the CO2 price.  As a result, this simulation 
is akin to a national CO2 regulation, in which leakage is reduced by the imposition of a 
tax or a permit purchase requirement on imports from outside the country.2   
Table 2.3 shows the results of our AC simulation.  With a $5 price on CO2 
emissions, there is a 0.5% reduction in CO2 emissions, which comes at a cost of $0.01 
per tonne in terms of the cost of operating the power system.  With a $120 price, there 
is a 7.6% reduction in emissions, which comes at a cost of $95 per tonne.  Raising the 
CO2 price from $120 to $250 has little additional effect on the predicted operation of 
the power system, and consequently has little additional effect on emissions or on the 
cost of power production. 
Table 2.3:  Changes in Emissions if Regulation Applied to Whole Region, 
Predicted Using AC Model 
 CO2 $5 CO2 $120 CO2 $250 
Change in emissions 
High load 
Low load 
Weighted average 
-0.001% 
-2% 
-0.5% 
-0.6% 
-37% 
-7.4% 
-0.9% 
-37% 
-7.5% 
Cost of reductions 
(change in operating cost)
High load 
Low load 
Weighted average 
$3/tonne 
$.004/tonne 
$.01/tonne 
$66/tonne 
$97/tonne 
$95/tonne 
$98/tonne 
$97/tonne 
$97/tonne 
 
Table 2.4 shows the predictions of the DC model as well as the AC model.  In 
this case, the predicted effect of the policy on emissions is similar in the two models, 
but the estimated cost per tonne of CO2 emissions differs by nearly a factor of two. 
                                                 
2 The RGGI states may be prohibited by federal inter-state commerce laws from addressing leakage 
from other states in this way. 
 40 
Table 2.4:  DC Model Versus AC Model:  Predicted Emission Reductions with 
$120 CO2 Price and with Regulation in Whole Modeled Region 
 DC model AC model 
Change in emissions 
High load 
Low load 
Weighted average 
-0.2% 
-48% 
-8% 
-0.6% 
-37% 
-7.4% 
Cost of reductions  
(change in operating cost)
High load 
Low load 
Weighted average 
$118/tonne 
$50/tonne 
$52/tonne 
$66/tonne 
$97/tonne 
$95/tonne 
 
Our results are sensitive to the assumed distribution of load.  As mentioned 
above, we are assuming a very simple distribution of high load one third of the time 
and low load for the other two thirds of the time. 
5.  Conclusions and Future Research 
Based on this pilot analysis, we draw some tentative conclusions.  First, in the 
short run, emission reductions on the order of 7% may require permit prices and 
system operation cost increases well above the $10-per-tonne “trigger price” in RGGI.  
Second, permit prices in a cap-and-trade program can vary greatly as a result of only a 
small change in required emission reductions.  For example, to reduce emission 
reductions from 7.4% below business as usual to 7.5% below business as usual, our 
simulation predicts that the permit price would have to more than double, from $120 
per tonne of CO2 to $250.  In contrast to a cap and trade program, a CO2 tax would 
prevent volatility in the prices of CO2 emissions.  A more predictable emission price 
would reduce the risk associated with investments in CO2 emission reductions, and 
therefore make them more appealing to risk-averse companies.   
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Third, AC results differ from DC results.  Since the AC model is a more 
realistic representation of how the power supply system physically operates, we 
believe that this is a reason to consider using AC modeling. 
To improve the simulation, the following parameter improvements are in 
progress: 
• Detailed generator representation 
• Predicted load and capacity by sub-region, 2009–2018 
• Derating of generation capacity based on historical planned and 
unplanned outage rates 
• Predicted fuel prices, 2009–2018 
• Effect of RGGI on natural gas price 
• Contingencies 
• Geographically larger, more detailed, purpose-made reduction of 
eastern power system 
• Improvement of solution algorithm 
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CHAPTER THREE:  
PUBLIC DECISION-MAKING AND TIME INCONSISTENCY:  
EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES1 
1.  Introduction 
Governments often must decide when and if they should undertake actions 
involving up-front costs and delayed benefits.  In many of these cases, they are 
criticized for excessively delaying or ultimately foregoing an action with apparent net 
social benefits.  For example, the United States has a long history of delaying action to 
reduce known toxic threats, including cigarette smoke, lead, DDT, and mercury.  
Many governments have been slow to take action to reduce the spread of pandemics 
such as HIV/AIDS, which now infects a quarter of the population in some nations.  
Education and infrastructure also are chronically under-funded in many countries. 
There are many possible explanations for the above delays and failures to act, 
one of which is time inconsistency.  An individual exhibits time inconsistency if his 
preferences over a set of outcomes change as a function of only his reference point in 
time relative to the outcomes.2  As an illustration, suppose that we could ask a person 
either in January or in February whether he would like to spend less and invest more 
in February.  If he would honestly answer yes in January but no in February, in spite 
of there being no unanticipated change in circumstances, then this would be a case of 
time inconsistency.  Prior experimental research has shown time inconsistency in 
decisions over individual outcomes (e.g., Green, Fristoe, and Myerson, 1994; see 
Henderson and Langford, 1998 and Frederick et al., 2002 for summaries).  Further, 
                                                 
1 Daniel L. Shawhan, Department of Economics, Sage Lab, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 110 8th St, 
Troy NY 12180, USA; Jeffrey T. Prince, Department of Applied Economics and Management, Warren 
Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca NY 14853, USA. 
2 This notion of time inconsistency is based on ideas in the behavioral economics literature.  In other 
economics literature, time inconsistency often refers to governments’ inability to keep commitments to 
certain policies as time passes.  However, the change in preferred policy over time is due to something 
more than just the passing of time in these instances.  It is often due to induced behavior of constituents 
caused by the original policy.   
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prior theoretical research has shown this behavior can lead to excessive (even infinite) 
delays in performing desirable tasks – specifically those where costs are realized 
before benefits.  These delays can ultimately result in significant welfare losses 
(O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). 
While some behaviors manifest themselves similarly in individual and group 
decisions, others do not.  For example, prior experimental research has found 
differences between individuals and groups in rationality and risk preference (see 
Bornstein and Yaniv, 1998, and Shupp and Williams, 2006).3  As of this writing, very 
little research has examined whether or not time inconsistency extends to decisions 
over group outcomes, and there has been little discussion about the potential social 
welfare consequences if it does.4  This is true in spite of the closing words in Strotz’s 
classic 1956 paper on individual time inconsistency:   
We have here treated the problem of the intertemporal tussle only in the 
context of microeconomics.  Similar issues may arise, however, in the 
aggregate case where a group of persons or an economy must decide the 
distribution of economic activity over time.  Political decisions to eliminate a 
foreign trade deficit or to balance a budget not this year, but next may serve as 
illustrations. 
In this paper, we show that time inconsistency in group decision-making can 
reduce social welfare.  We then describe some of the patterns of behavior that may 
result from time inconsistency.  Next, using an experiment with real-money 
incentives, we show that time inconsistency, as found for individual preferences, 
extends to preferences over group outcomes.  We discuss implications for public 
policy and means of reducing time inconsistency.  Finally, we present examples of 
                                                 
3 See Cox, 2002, Kerr, MacCoun and Kramer, 1996, Kocher and Sutter, 2005, and Bone, Hey, and 
Suckling, 1999 for several more individual vs. group comparisons. 
4 Cairns, 1994, and Lazaro et al., 2001 & 2002b, find evidence of declining discount rates for social 
outcomes.  However, all three papers use hypothetical surveys, and none finds any direct evidence of 
time inconsistency. 
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government decision sequences in the past that may be explained by time 
inconsistency. 
If time inconsistency does exist for group outcomes, the stakes can be high.  
Many future governmental decisions involve options with up-front costs and delayed 
benefits.  For example, reductions in global-warming emissions may be costly in the 
near term and may provide benefits for hundreds of years into the future.  Another 
important issue is the threat from weapons of mass destruction.  Reducing this risk, for 
example by benevolence in foreign policy or by costly restrictions or actions to 
prevent the spread of dangerous technology, may involve costs in the near future and 
benefits in the more distant future.  Meanwhile, with billions of people living in 
poverty, the arguments for more and better education, health care, and other poverty-
alleviating investments remain.  Delaying or forgoing investments such as these as a 
result of time inconsistency may be very costly in the long run.  Our experimental 
findings suggest that time inconsistency, consequent welfare losses, and ways to 
reduce them are legitimate concerns for public policy. 
2.  Social Welfare Losses Due to Time Inconsistency  
2a.  Social welfare losses from time inconsistency when borrowing is possible 
In this section, we show how time inconsistency, in the form of a decreasing 
proportion voting for an investment, can lead to social welfare losses.  Assume there 
are three time periods, 0, 1, and 2.  A group receives income Y1 in period 1 and Y2 in 
period 2.  The group can invest amount I in period 1, in which case its income is 
reduced by I in period 1 but is increased by I(1+r) in period 2.  In either period 0 or 
period 1, the group votes on whether to make the investment in period 1.  If it votes in 
period 0, we say it makes the decision with a front-end delay.  If it votes in period 1, 
we say it makes the decision with no front-end delay. 
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The group can also borrow any amount in period 1.  Let c denote the amount of 
income the group chooses to borrow in period 1.  Then the group’s income in period 1 
is increased by c, but its income in period 2 is reduced by c(1+s).   
If the group does not invest, but borrows c in period 1 and pays it back in 
period 2, then its income in period 1 is  
 Y1 + c  (1) 
and its income in period 2 is  
 Y2 – c(1+s).   (2) 
If the group does invest, it can achieve income in period 1 of Y1 + c, the same 
as in (1), by borrowing I + c.  In that case, its income in period 2 is  
 Y2 + I(1+r) – (I+c)(1+s),  
which simplifies to 
 Y2 – c(1+s) + I(r-s).   (3) 
A comparison of (3) versus (2) reveals that if r > s, investing produces an 
unambiguous increase in wealth, while if r < s, investing produces an unambiguous 
reduction in wealth.  Whether social welfare increases with wealth depends on the 
distribution of wealth and on the social welfare function used.  For example, if each 
individual’s income in each period is a strictly increasing function of societal wealth 
and if social welfare is a strictly increasing function of each individual’s income in 
each period, then social welfare is a strictly increasing function of societal wealth. 
Assuming social welfare is a strictly increasing function of societal wealth, the 
group can make two kinds of mistakes.  The first is to fail to invest when r > s.  The 
second is to invest when s > r.  Either of these mistakes produces a reduction in wealth 
and welfare compared with the alternative, as explained in the preceding paragraph. 
Time inconsistency is not a necessary condition for a group to be capable of 
making such mistakes, but accompanied by some other assumptions, it is a sufficient 
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condition.  Assume that the final vote on an investment could be taken either in time 
period 0 or in time period 1.  Let t denote the time period in which the vote is taken.  
Let P(r-s,t) denote the proportion of voters who cast votes in favor of an investment.  
To allow P to be a continuous function for the sake of simplicity, assume that at least 
one person can cast a split vote, any portion of which is in favor of the investment, and 
the remainder of which is opposed to the investment.  Assume P is a strictly increasing 
function of (r-s) and a strictly decreasing function of t.  Further assume that for some 
values of (r-s), P(r-s,0) > 0.5 and that for some values of (r-s), P(r-s,1) < 0.5.  Then for 
some range of values of (r-s), the proportion voting in favor of the investment will be a 
majority if the vote occurs in time period 0, but a minority if the vote occurs in time 
period 1.  For any given value of (r-s) in this range, other than 0, one or the other of 
these decisions would be a mistake.  Therefore, given the other assumptions in this 
paragraph, time inconsistency, in the form of a declining proportion of votes for an 
investment, is a sufficient condition for wealth-reducing mistakes to be possible.  An 
implication is that, again given the assumptions in this paragraph, a time-inconsistent 
group will be capable of wealth-reducing mistakes regardless of the other 
characteristics of the group. 
2b.  Behaviors that can result from time inconsistency in voting 
In majority-rule time inconsistency, the majority switches from voting in favor 
of investing to voting against investing, as a function of a change in the group’s 
reference point in time relative to the possible investment.  In our experiment, the 
proportion in favor of investing was lower when the amount of time between the vote 
and the potential investment was less.  This points to the first behavior that may result 
from majority-rule time inconsistency:  Preferring in advance to make some 
investment, then preferring less far in advance not to make that investment.  As stated 
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above, if r > s, and if borrowing is possible, then failing to invest results in an 
unambiguous reduction of societal wealth. 
If the investment can be made later, then the majority may prefer to make the 
investment later even as it votes not to make the investment at the earliest possible 
time.  This can be called “delay.”   
As time passes and the later potential investment time becomes the earliest 
possible investment time, the group may again prefer not to invest at that new earliest 
possible investment time, again preferring to delay the investment.  This can be called 
“repeated delay.”  In the extreme, delay can be repeated infinitely.  If r > s, and if 
borrowing is possible, then each delay results in an unambiguous reduction of societal 
wealth. 
The opportunity to make the investment later rather than sooner may even be 
the reason for delaying.  That is, investing at the soonest possible investment time may 
be preferred to not investing at all, but may be passed over in favor of investing at the 
later investment time.  If the group repeats this behavior, then it repeatedly passes up 
its preferred option, the option of investing. 
3.  The Experiment 
We have shown above that time inconsistency can lead to social welfare losses.  
It may be possible that phenomena such as other-regarding behavior could temper 
individuals’ time-inconsistency problems (that we know exist for personal decisions) 
when they are members of a group.  For example, individuals could have time-
inconsistent preferences about outcomes that apply only to them, but time-consistent 
preferences about outcomes that apply to others.  In this section and the next, we 
present a test of this possibility. 
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We employed a between-subjects design, using 239 subjects recruited from an 
introductory business management class at Cornell University.5  As the subjects 
entered the symmetrical room used for the experiment, we directed half to sit on the 
left side and half to sit on the right side, on an alternating basis.  The instructions told 
each subject that she had been assigned to a group that included half of the class, but 
included nothing about a difference in treatments between the groups. 
Those on one side of the room were in the “immediate payment group.”  For 
them, the initial payment time was at the end of the experiment session, while the final 
payment time was three weeks after the session.  Those on the other side of the room 
were in the “delayed payment group.”  For them, the initial payment time was three 
weeks after the experiment session and the final payment time was six weeks after the 
session.   
The instructions told the subjects that all payments would be in cash and that 
they would receive their future payments in their class.  The instructions further 
explained that we would individually contact any student who failed to collect a future 
payment in class, in order to arrange payment in person or via certified mail or courier 
service. 
Each subject was asked to make an “individual decision” and to vote on a 
“group decision.”  To control for order effects, we randomized which question was 
listed first.  The instructions explained that one of these two decisions, selected at 
random, would be implemented.   
Since in the group decisions subjects make their choices via their votes and do 
not directly choose the outcome, we can assume that each has voted for her preferred 
group outcome only if voting is demand revealing.  Prior work has shown that voting 
on a dichotomous choice between group real-money outcomes is both incentive-
                                                 
5 Experiment materials are available at: 
http://www.people.cornell.edu/pages/jtp35/index_files/OnlineApp2.pdf 
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compatible (i.e., participants have an incentive to reveal their true preference) and 
transparent (i.e., participants can easily see that it is incentive compatible).6  In 
conjunction, these findings justify the assumption that voting is, in fact, demand 
revealing. 
In the group decision, each subject had an initial balance of $7, receivable at 
her initial payment time.  Each subject had to vote for one of two payment streams, 
dubbed option A and option B.  In option A, each subject would pay $1 (out of her 
initial balance) at the initial payment time and receive $3.50 at the final payment time.  
In option B, each subject would pay $5 (out of her initial balance) at the initial 
payment time and receive $8.50 at the final payment time.  Table 3.1 shows these 
options.  The instructions told each subject that the option receiving a majority of the 
votes cast by the members of her group would be applied to her entire group.  
The individual decision facing each subject was identical to the group decision 
except that, as explained in the instructions, each subject’s decision would apply only 
to her. 
Table 3.1:  Schedule of Payment Options for Each Group 
Group Option Receive today 
Receive 3 
weeks from 
today 
Receive 6 
weeks from 
today 
A $7 - $1 = $6 $3.50 - Immediate 
payment 
group B $7 - $5 = $2 $8.50 - 
A - $7 - $1 = $6 $3.50 Delayed 
payment 
group B - $7 - $5 = $2 $8.50 
 
                                                 
6 See Plott and Levine (1978) and Farquharson (1969). 
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If our subjects generally are time consistent, we should observe similar choice 
patterns between options A and B across the immediate and delayed payment groups; 
otherwise, we view this as evidence of time inconsistency.  We are particularly 
interested in whether there is a difference in voting patterns across the immediate and 
delayed payment groups for the group decision, and how this difference compares to 
that for the individual decision. 
4.  Experiment Results 
In our results, the pattern that would reflect time inconsistency is a statistically 
significant difference in the percentage choosing option A in the immediate payment 
group and the percentage choosing option A in the delayed payment group, since the 
only difference between these two groups is their reference point in time relative to the 
available outcomes.   
We present our “group decision” results in Table 3.2.7  In the immediate 
payment group, 42 of the 119 subjects voted for option A.  In the delayed payment 
group, 23 of the 115 subjects voted for option A.  The difference is statistically 
significant at conventional levels using a simple binomial test of proportions (p < .01).  
Consequently, we reject the null hypothesis of no time inconsistency.  This yields our 
first conclusion:  Individuals exhibit time inconsistency in group decisions.For 
comparison, we present the results for the “individual decision” in Table 3.3.  In the 
immediate payment group, 48 out of 119 chose option A.  In the delayed payment 
group, 20 out of 115 chose option A.  We find time inconsistency for this decision as 
well (p < .01).   
                                                 
7 We removed from the data set five students who had participated in a pilot version of the same 
experiment and one who failed to answer one of the questions. 
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Table 3.2:  Results for Group Decision 
 
Voted for  
option A 
Voted for  
option B Total subjects
Immediate  
payment group 42 (35%) 77 (65%) 119 
Delayed  
payment group 23 (20%) 92 (80%) 115 
 
Table 3.3:  Results for Individual Decision 
 
Voted for  
option A 
Voted for  
option B Total subjects
Immediate  
payment group 48 (40%) 71 (60%) 119 
Delayed  
payment group 20 (17%) 95 (83%) 115 
 
We wish to test whether there is a difference in rates of time inconsistency 
between the individual decision and the group decision.  Table 3.4 shows the 
switching rates for the immediate and delayed payment group across the “individual 
decision” and the “group decision.”  In it, we show the number who chose A in the 
individual decision and B in the group decision and the number who chose the reverse.  
In the immediate payment group, 11 of the 119 subjects chose option A only in the 
individual decision and 5 chose option A only in the group decision.  This difference 
in switching rates is not statistically significant at conventional levels (p = 0.21 using 
McNemar’s test).  This yields our second conclusion:  The participant behavior in the 
group decision did not differ significantly from the participant behavior in the 
individual decision.  Of course, this does not definitively mean that there are no 
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differences in time inconsistency between individual and group decisions.  Future 
experiments could test further for such differences. 
Table 3.4:  Switching Rates 
 Chose option A only in individual decision 
Chose option A only in 
group decision 
Immediate payment 
group (119 participants) 11 5 
Delayed payment  
group (115 participants) 4 7 
 
The time inconsistency in both the group and individual decisions is 
overwhelmingly a male phenomenon.  Table 3.5 shows the results for the group 
decisions.  Thirteen percent of the males in the delayed payment group chose option 
A, while 42% of the males in the immediate payment group chose option A.  This 
difference is highly significant (p < .01).  In contrast, the percentages of females 
choosing A were nearly identical in the delayed and immediate payment groups, 27% 
and 28%.  The gender results for the individual decisions are qualitatively the same as 
those for the group decisions, as shown in Table 3.6.  
There are two key aspects of the above experiment that we believe enhance the 
reliability of our results.  First, the choices involve real money.  Prior research (e.g., 
Bohm, 1994) has shown that humans sometimes choose differently in real-money 
decisions than they would in otherwise-similar hypothetical decisions.  Second, our 
subjects were not confronted with a large number of decisions or options.  Therefore, 
boredom and perceived irrelevance are likely not issues for the decision-makers 
because the incentives are sufficient for payoff dominance (Smith, 1982).   
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Table 3.5:  Number of Subjects, by Gender, Choosing Each Option in Group 
Decision 
Gender Group Chose option A Chose option B Total  
Male 
Delayed 
payment group 7 (13%) 49 (87%) 56 
 
Immediate 
payment group 25 (42%) 34 (58%) 59 
Female 
Delayed 
payment group 16 (27%) 43 (73%) 59 
 
Immediate 
payment group 17 (28%) 43 (72%) 60 
 
Table 3.6:  Number of Subjects, by Gender, Choosing Each Option in Individual 
Decision 
Gender Group Chose option A Chose option B Total  
Male Delayed 
payment group 5 (9%) 51 (91%) 56 
 Immediate 
payment group 31 (53%) 28 (47%) 59 
Female Delayed 
payment group 15 (25%) 44 (75%) 59 
 Immediate 
payment group 17 (28%) 43 (72%) 60 
5.  Discussion 
Our experimental results provide evidence that time inconsistency extends to 
group choice over some outcomes, at least among males. 
When the front-end delay is shortened, in our case from 21 to zero days, time 
inconsistency could result in either an increase or a decrease in the proportion of 
voters voting for option A, the lower-up-front-cost, lower-delayed-benefit option.  In 
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our experiment, it resulted in an increase.  This could result from some of the voters, 
specifically some of the male voters, discounting future costs and benefits 
“hyperbolically.”  In hyperbolic discounting, the per-period discount rate decreases if 
the front-end delay between decision and prospective investment increases. 
Group decisions frequently are made by families, boards of directors, 
government officials (e.g. members of a legislature), and the general population (e.g. 
in the case of referenda).  Even if elected representatives do not have time-inconsistent 
preferences themselves, they may feel compelled to vote in a time-inconsistent manner 
if their constituents have such preferences.  In this section, we discuss implications 
and possible historical examples of time inconsistency in group decision-making, as 
well as limitations of our findings.   
5.1.  Implications for public decision-making 
Many public policy decisions concerning infrastructure, health, the 
environment, science, and the military involve two or more options with varying up-
front costs and delayed, expected benefits.  The options in our experiment were 
designed to be as analogous to these types of decisions as possible.  For example, 
option A could be considered analogous to low spending on education, while option B 
could be considered analogous to higher education spending and concomitantly higher 
future benefits from a more educated populus. 
For the remainder of this subsection, we focus on two approaches that could 
eliminate or at least mitigate some of the problems resulting from time inconsistency 
in public decision-making.  The first approach is awareness.  Time-inconsistent 
decision-makers may be unaware of their time inconsistency problem.  If those who 
are unaware are made aware of their time inconsistency, some of the delays 
symptomatic of decisions with up-front costs and delayed benefits could be avoided 
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(O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999).  In addition, group members could choose to delegate 
some decisions to people or subgroups with known time consistency.   
Our results suggest that women may be a time-consistent subgroup, at least for 
the type of decision in our experiment.  Gender differences in time consistency, and in 
inter-temporal discounting more generally, have implications for public policy.  The 
prevalence of men in government and corporate decision-making roles may have 
systematic effects on decisions.  For example, the historical instances of government 
policy reversals that will be described in subsection 5.2 might not have occurred if 
women rather than men had predominated in the government bodies that made those 
policies. 
The second approach is to manipulate the front-end delay in decisions in order 
to change decision outcomes.  If the proportion of group members supporting an 
investment increases with front-end delay, as in our experiment results, then 
increasing the front-end delay may change a group’s decision about a particular 
investment from disapproval to approval.  For example, school boards that repeatedly 
fail to win referenda for investing in physical improvements to schools could try 
increasing the front-end delay, i.e. proposing that the physical improvements occur 
two or more years in the future instead of one.8  
5.2.  Possible Historical Evidence of Time Inconsistency in Governmental Decisions 
In this subsection, we present some historical examples suggestive of time 
inconsistency in public policy.  One example may be the pattern of foreign aid goals 
set, then later missed.  Several times since 1970, the world’s higher-income nations 
have espoused the goal of each giving 0.7% of national income as aid to developing 
                                                 
8 In the United States, most school construction is funded by bonds, so the “pain,” in the form of tax 
increases or reductions in other spending, is already likely to be spread over multiple future years.  
However, voters might still perceive the date of the physical improvements as an important indicator of 
when they will experience the pain. 
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countries (United Nations 1970, UNICEF 1996, Beattie 2005, Ortiz 2005, Sachs 
2005).  However, only six of the countries have met that goal (WDM 2004).  In 2004, 
the aggregate percentage given by the 30 wealthy nations that constitute the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development was 0.25% (Beattie 2005). 
In the last several years, the governments of some individual countries have set 
deadlines for themselves to reach certain percentages by certain dates.  However, in a 
pattern consistent with time inconsistency, most of these deadlines have been missed 
or have been postponed as they have approached.  Finland missed its 2000 deadline to 
give 0.4%, giving 0.31% that year (OECD 1998, OECD 2003a).  In 2000, the 
government of Ireland set and publicized a 2002 deadline to give 0.45% and a 2007 
deadline to give 0.7%.  Ireland missed the 2002 deadline, but the 2007 deadline still 
enjoyed widespread support in 2003 (Trocaire 2004, Taoiseach 2003).  However, in 
2005 the same government and prime minister that had set the 2007 deadline 
postponed it to 2012 (The Mirror 2005).  Norway and Luxembourg missed their 2005 
deadline to give 1%, respectively giving 0.93% and 0.87% that year (OECD 2003b, 
OECD 2004, OECD 2006).  In Luxembourg as in Ireland, the shortfall occurred in 
spite of widespread support for increased aid (OECD 2003b) and no change in prime 
minister.  Outside of the six countries that have met the UN target of 0.7%, the only 
instances we have found of aid percentage targets reached are a UK target of 0.33%, 
set when the UK was at 0.32%, and a US target of at least 0.15%, set when the US was 
at 0.17%. 
Another possible past instance of time inconsistency has to do with dams on 
the Paute River in Ecuador.  The Congress of Ecuador decided to have two 
hydroelectric dams built on the Paute River.  The downstream dam was built first and 
provides approximately one third of the country’s electric power.  The upstream dam, 
though smaller, was necessary to reduce the country’s chronic shortage-induced power 
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outages and to prevent silt from severely shortening the life of the downstream dam.  
However, consistent with time inconsistency, the Congress repeatedly failed to 
appropriate funds for the upstream dam until 20 years after the downstream dam had 
been built.  As a result, the country suffered increased power outages and, in spite of 
costly remedial dredging, the downstream dam’s reservoir accumulated the amount of 
silt it was designed to accumulate in the dam’s intended 50-year operating life.  
(Mercurio 2003, Hidropaute 2005, Malo 2005) 
Another possible instance of time inconsistency could be the behavior of the 
United States Congress regarding completion of levees designed to protect New 
Orleans from hurricane storm surges.  In the three years prior to the flooding of New 
Orleans by Hurricane Katrina, Congress cut funding for levee construction along 
Lakes Pontchartrian and Borgne, bringing construction nearly to a standstill and 
preventing the scheduled heightening of levee segments that were two to four feet 
below their design heights (Mittala 2005, Grissett 2004). The inadequacy of New 
Orleans’ levees had very costly consequences when Hurricane Katrina flooded the city 
in August of 2005. 
The above are but a few of many examples.  While we cannot claim that any 
one of them is direct evidence of time inconsistency in public decision-making, the 
large number of such incidents combined with our experimental results suggests that 
time inconsistency likely has played a role in some public decisions. 
5.3.  Limitations 
The above examples suggest that our experimental findings extend to actual 
public decisions;  however, we recognize there are several limitations in this regard.  
First, our time scale is relatively small (six weeks maximum).  Most public policy 
decisions involve costs and benefits over a much longer period of time than our 
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experiment.  However, if per-period or instantaneous discounting is in fact strictly 
decreasing over these longer periods, or if political costs are immediate and 
significant, time inconsistency could still result.   
Second, the group to which our subjects belonged was anonymous.  It could be 
that they would have voted differently if they had known who else comprised their 
group.  However, the seating arrangement (with a clear divide down the middle of the 
room) suggested to which group each belonged.   
Finally, the costs and benefits in our experiment were relatively small in 
magnitude.  It may be the case that time inconsistency declines as the size of the costs 
and benefits increases. 
6.  Conclusion 
In this paper, using a simple model, we have shown that time inconsistency can 
lead to welfare losses and to characteristic patterns of behavior.  Through a simple 
experiment and historical examples, we have shown evidence that time inconsistency 
may exist in public decision-making, particularly when males are involved.  We have 
also discussed implications for public policy and means of reducing time 
inconsistency. 
For future work, our findings suggest the need for field experiments and 
econometric studies to further explore and identify the prevalence of time 
inconsistency in public decision-making.  To the extent that time inconsistency indeed 
applies in public decisions, further research could test the effectiveness of approaches 
to dealing with it. 
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CONCLUSION 
The first paper experimentally tests a novel mechanism used to suppress the 
exercise of market power in New York City and neighboring West Chester.  We find 
that this mechanism can reduce market prices.  However, if generation owners have 
enough market power even during periods without transmission-system congestion, as 
may be true in some parts of the world, the owners are able to gradually raise the 
market price well above short-run marginal cost in spite of the mechanism.  If they are 
not able to do this, the mechanism keeps the market price of electricity too low during 
times of high demand to induce adequate investment in generation and energy 
conservation.  
A future step in the research on this mechanism is to vary its parameters to 
determine how this affects its performance.  For example, would the mechanism still 
work if the allowable margin were increased during times of very high demand?  
Another future step is to compare the performance of this mechanism with that of 
other mechanisms for addressing market power in wholesale electricity markets. 
The second paper simulates the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, which 
will impose a cap-and-trade program on the carbon dioxide emissions of the electric 
power sector in ten northeastern US states.  Constraints in the power transmission 
system, an alternating-current system, affect the cost of the policy and the emission 
increases it will induce in neighboring states and provinces.  To our knowledge, this is 
the first study that uses an alternating-current model to predict the effects of an 
environmental policy.  We find that there are important differences between our 
simulation’s predictions and those of a direct-current approximation. 
Our next step in this area will be to make the analysis more detailed, 
incorporating the thousands of generation units in the Northeast, with their varied 
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marginal costs and emission rates.  Another future step will be to combine our power 
system model with an air quality fate and transport model to guide efficient regulation 
of other pollutants. 
The third paper examines the possibility of time inconsistency in public 
decision-making.  In time inconsistency, an individual’s preferences over a set of 
outcomes change as a function of only his reference point in time relative to the 
outcomes.  We show that time inconsistency in group decisions can lead to welfare 
losses.  Through a simple experiment and historical examples, we produce evidence 
that time inconsistency may exist in public decision-making, particularly when males 
are involved.  We also discuss implications for public policy and means of reducing 
time inconsistency.  Future research in this area could examine the prevalence of time 
inconsistent decision-making in various group decision contexts, and the effectiveness 
of various possible means of improving intertemporal group decision-making.   
